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My co-author Manoj Thomas (Johnson School of Management, Cornell University) and I were inspired to write Why
People (Don’t) Buy: The GO and STOP Signals because of the hit-or-miss patterns of consumer-insight
interventions that companies (as well as public policy entities) have been generating. This blog post, the first in a
series of three, describes a number of recent examples of hits and misses.
Improving in-store experience
Hit. In the first decade of this century, Ron Johnson, a Harvard MBA, built a
formidable reputation as a brilliant retail executive. His laser-sharp focus on
improving the in-store customer experience yielded rich dividends at Target. It
transformed Target from just-another-discount-store to a unique store brand that
sells chic yet affordable products. Target became Targé. Not just at Target, the
same focus on customer experience during Johnson’s tenure at Apple made
Apple Stores, including the Genius Bar, a runaway success and one of the most
profitable retail outlets in the country. A similar focus helped him improve patient
experiences and outcomes at a Stanford University hospital.
Miss. Inexplicably, however, during Johnson’s tenure at JC Penney, the same
strategy led to a 25 per cent drop in sales and over $500 million in losses in a
single year and culminated in Johnson’s being fired in a little over fourteen
months.
Launching a new pack
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Hit. When Nabisco executives introduced the new “100-calorie pack” format
for their cookies in 2004, it was an unqualified success and competitors
rushed to copy this packaging innovation. The end result was a boom for
snack-food brands. Sales of 100-calorie cookie packs reached the $200
million-a-year mark by 2007, even though they often charged a 250 per cent
price premium over regular packs.
Miss. However, in 2007, at the height of this 100-calorie frenzy, Ocean
Spray introduced a 100-calorie pack for their “Craisins” snack and it was
such a failure that the company ultimately withdrew it from the market.
Bottom-of-pyramid strategies
Hit. Tata, a large multi-industry Indian conglomerate with worldwide
operations, harnessed its excellent in-house engineering skills in order to
reduce costs and introduce many successful innovations for bottom-of-
pyramid (BOP) consumers. These innovations ranged from bringing low cost
electricity and steel to the BOP customer to providing low-cost, yet highly
effective, water purifiers (e.g., the “Swach” brand) and fortified energy drinks
(e.g., the “Activate” and “Gluco Plus” brands). Lowering the price for the
bottom-of-pyramid consumer led to many successes for Tata and bettered the
lives of many impoverished individuals.
Miss. Yet, this single-minded focus on reducing the price for low-
income consumers proved to be an unequivocal failure when it came to the
Tata Nano car, which, at a sticker price of $2000, was heralded by the international press as the “world’s cheapest
car” solution. Before Tata Nano, the Indian bottom-of-pyramid consumer was stuck between the Scylla, with unsafe,
weather-susceptible two-wheeler driving conditions, and the Charybdis, with its unaffordable, $4000-plus price tag.
Tata Nano, targeted at this customer, was expected to storm the Indian market and sell hundreds of thousands of
units. To put this failure in perspective, consider that a paltry 509 Nanos sold in November 2010 (3 years after its
launch), at a time when automobile sales in India had reached more than 200,000 units per month.
This hit-or-miss pattern is not restricted to consumer markets; it is equally widespread in the public policy domain.
There are several examples of policy interventions leading to spectacular success in one domain, but resulting in
colossal failures in others.
Convenience-enhancing technologies
Hit. Making it easy for consumers to order products and services from the convenience and comfort of their homes
has increased consumer participation in the marketplace and led to the success of several online giants like
Amazon, eBay and Fresh Direct, to name a few.
Miss. Allowing people to cast their votes in a secure manner from the convenience of their homes completely
backfired for the Swiss. Ironically, the presence of home-based (i.e., postal or online) voting significantly reduced
voter turnout in Swiss cantonal elections from 1971 to 1999.
Monetary incentives
Hit. Governments have always used monetary carrots to encourage socially desirable behaviours. Providing
monetary incentives has allowed governments all over the world to successfully encourage their citizens to buy
hybrid cars, recycle plastic bottles, and build energy-efficient homes, to name a few.
Miss. Monetary incentives, however, not only failed to spur blood donations, they, in fact, decreased blood donations
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in 2007 at the Regional Blood Center, Sahlgrenska University Hospital in Gothenburg, Sweden.
Monetary fines
Hit. In a similar vein, governments all over the world have successfully used monetary fines to curb socially
undesirable behaviours like late payment of taxes, littering, and smoking in public spaces, to name a few.
Miss. Monetary fines, however, backfired when in an instance documented in Israel, charging parents a monetary
fine for picking up their kids late from daycare actually increased late pickups.
The business and public policy landscape is littered with examples of such hit-or-miss patterns, many of which we
document in this book. We were inspired by and wanted to make sense of these patterns. More specifically, we
wanted to answer two very simple but critical questions:
1. Why do these hit-or-miss patterns occur, that is, what kind of decision-making errors were managers and
policy makers committing? and
2. Is there an alternative model of thinking about consumer insights and public policy interventions that would
allow managers and policy makers to avoid making such errors?
We are excited to share with you what we found. However, both of us know better than to test the blog length-
patience of our readers! So we will save the details and answers to these two questions for our next blog post.
In the meantime—as a brief preview—the answer to both questions lies in what we refer to as the GO & STOP
signals framework. It is the chief protagonist of our book. Through many case studies, we illustrate that
understanding this framework is useful in explaining paradoxical consumer behaviour, why smart managers and
policy makers make strategic mistakes, and how to avoid such mistakes. We hope that learning about this will
change the way you think about consumer insights and public policy interventions. It certainly helped us make
sense of these bewildering hit-or-miss patterns.
Figure 1. In the next blog post we will talk about the GO & STOP Signal Framework and Vulcans, Hedgehogs, and the like…hope you can join us!
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Amitav Chakravarti explains the “GO and STOP” concept:
♣♣♣
Notes:
This post is based on the author’s book Why People (Don’t) Buy: The GO and STOP Signals , co-authored
with Manoj Thomas. Palgrave MacMillan, 2015.
The post gives the views of its author, not the position of LSE Business Review or the London School of
Economics.
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